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I. INTRODUCTION*
Post-colonial theory can provide a meaningful interrogation of the goals
and methods of the human rights regime. With its concern for exposing the
exploitative and paternalistic legacy of the international community’s
developing world agenda, the post-colonial inquiry offers an opportunity to
the human rights community to revisit its mandate. The international law
branch of this theoretical school arose contemporaneously2 with a latedeveloping area of human rights known as economic, social and cultural
rights.3 Although economic, social and cultural rights formed a significant
part of the original post-war body of human rights doctrine, they were
casualties of ideologically based Cold War politics, remaining unenforced
and underdeveloped until the creation of the UN Committee on Economic,
Socialand Cultural Rights (the “Committee”) in the late 1980s.
Economic, social and cultural rights in turn pose a challenge to the
general post-colonial critique of human rights law. The Committee’s
primary subject matter - macroeconomic spending priorities and welfare
policies, and their effect on poverty alleviation and minorities – falls
squarely within southern policy terrain the colonial powers most famously
resisted relinquishing. Yet the Committee’s recommendations often run
counter to the liberal international financial mandates that the south4
*

This Article expands on a presentation delivered at the Postcolonial Law: The Uses
of Theory in Law Reform Projects conference. The presentation was solicited as a human
rights expert’s statement to a panel of theorists considering the post-colonial implications of
internationally initiated law reform projects.
2. Post-colonial theory recently expanded from a focus on literature and history to a
more detailed exploration of law; the first works cited in a recent compilation date to the
mid-1980s. See Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian-Smith, Laws of the Postcolonial: An
Insistent Introduction, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 1, 15 n. 7 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter
Fitzpatrick eds., 1999) (noting that engagements between law and postcolonialism have
been infrequent, astonishing, and understable).
3. “Economic, social and cultural rights” is a term of art in international law referring
to the corpus of human rights standards that is distinguished from the standards termed
“civil and political rights.”
4. Many writers struggle with the appropriate designation for the former colonies and
the former colonizers. See, e.g., D.K. FIELDHOUSE, THE WEST AND THE THIRD WORLD 1-3
(1999) (exploring whether the Third World countries have benefited or suffered from close
economic relationships with the more developed countries of the West); ROBERT J.C.
YOUNG, POSTCOLONIALISM: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 4-5 (2001). It remains to be
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unsuccessfully resisted for decades. Moreover, southern non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) have consistently advocated for including ESCRs
in the civil society agenda while most international NGOs are still
struggling with the decision to take up these rights.
Many specific aspects of the Committee’s jurisprudence respond
effectively to the concerns of postcolonial theory, such as its use of
equalization paradigms and enforcement language, interpretation of its antidiscrimination mandate, and the audience for its recommendations. In
other ways, the Committee’s work confirms a traditional north-south
critique of the human rights regime, such as the Committee’s treatment of
culturally based practices. Part IV of this Article reviews these aspects of
the Committee’s jurisprudence in detail, particularly focusing on the now
extensive body of Concluding Observations.
One key north-south sensitive exhortation is that the Committee should
expand its efforts to address the financial issues that most concern the
countries where economic, social and cultural rights are in deepest crisis.
The Committee is a natural partner to former colonies to protest debt loads
and to leverage international financial institution (“IFI”) and development
aid funds in the direction of poverty alleviation. Within its limited
resources, the Committee should continue to expand its inquiries into the
effects of the debt process, dealings of Member States with the IFIs, and
development aid on the economic, social and cultural rights of the poor.
The Committee should also consider more explicitly publicizing concerns
about private actors that impact ESCRs. To the extent that anti-poverty
human rights bodies such as the Committee advocate for a continuation of
coercive practices such as conditioning of aid, these recommendations may
depart from the post-colonial paradigm, which generally favors the
restoration of autonomy to former colonies.
II. UNIQUE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights monitors the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“CESCR” or the “Committee”), the world’s first international treaty to
elevate basic welfare needs of the poor to the level of human rights.
Political hostility toward this class of rights delayed the Committee’s
formation for more than a decade after most of the other UN treaty
monitoring bodies and limited involvement of the human rights regime in
seen whether Young’s choice, “tri-continental” will hold sway as a substitute reference to
poor countries (“tricontinentalism” as a substitute for the term postcolonial). In the
meantime, the present author will alternate amongst several commonly used terms:
South/North, East/West, developing/industrialized.
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poverty issues. Since 1986, by progressively interpreting its mandate, the
Committee has greatly furthered the jurisprudential credibility of economic,
social and cultural rights and maintained its status in a difficult political
atmosphere. The Committee’s sixteen years in existence form the most
important chapter in the history of economic, social and cultural rights, and
to analyze the Committee’s work requires an understanding of the
particular politics of that subject matter.

A. East Against West: Which Rights are Human Rights?
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)5 recorded the
immediate post-WWII consensus6 regarding moral standards for
government behavior toward its citizenry. The United States
enthusiastically participated in promulgating the UDHR, which was
intended to be the UN Charter’s Bill of Rights.7 The UDHR’s drafters
based it in part on the conception of rights contained in President Franklin
Roosevelt’s famous 1941 Four Human Freedoms speech.8 The “four
freedoms” were freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear.
The civil and political rights enshrined in the UDHR and the treaties that
followed it read like an updated version of the U.S. Bill of Rights. These
protections include freedom of expression, right to political participation,
freedom from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, right to effective
remedies, freedom of religion and right to non-discriminatory treatment.9 In
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Pt. I, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (recognizing the inherent
dignity and the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family is essential to
freedom, justice, and peace in the world).
6. The term “consensus” is used advisedly, referring only to the very high percentage
of endorsements the UDHR received in the 1948 General Assembly. Forty-eight of the
then-58 General Assembly members voted in favor of the UDHR, with eight abstentions and
two states absent from the vote. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Magna
Carta
for
all
Humanity,
United
Nations
Website,
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002). As of March 1,
2002, the United Nations included 189 member states. See List of Member States, United
Nations Website, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002)
(listing 189 member states of the United Nations with the dates on which they joined the
organization). As many commentators have since noted, the founding principles of the
international rights regime were established without the direct participation of most of the
colonized world leadership.
7. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING & INTENT 1 (1999) (discussing President Franklin Roosevelt’s enunciation of the
four freedoms and their influence on the Declaration of the United Nations).
8. Id.
9. See UDHR, supra note 5, art. 2 (establishing equal protection under the
Declaration), art. 5 (forbidding cruel and inhumane treatment or punishment); id. art. 8
(establishing due process); id. art. 18 (establishing freedom of religion); id. art. 19 (creating
the right of freedom of expression and opinion); id. art. 21 (establishing the right to
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addition to these civil and political rights, the UDHR also contains
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to social security,
work and favorable work conditions, labor union rights, rest and leisure,
adequate standard of living, including the right to food, clothing, housing,
and medical care, the right to education, the right to participate in culture
and the right to property.10 The Preamble of the UDHR justifies this
selection with a broad characterization of the basis for human rights:
“Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom . . . .”11
The drafters of the UDHR believed that the UDHR was the precursor to
a Human Rights Covenant, which would provide a mechanism for making
the UDHR binding on individual ratifying states.12 As the cold war
intensified, the Soviet Union championed ESCRs and the United States
championed civil and political rights: the Soviet Union urged the
promulgation of one Covenant listing all the UDHR rights, and the United
States insisted on locating ESCRs in a separate Covenant.13 The
forcefulness of the Soviet Union’s advocacy for a unitary regime may have
been weakened by its general concern about the interference of the
international community in domestic affairs.14 The result was a 1952
General Assembly Resolution mandating creation of two treaties instead of
one.15
participate, have access and contribute to government).
10. See UDHR, supra note 5, art. 17 (establishing the right to own property); id. art. 22
(establishing the right to social security and personal development); id. art. 23 (establishing
the right to work, free choice of employment and just employment conditions); id. art. 24
(establishing the right to rest and leisure); id. art. 25 (establishing the right to an adequate
standard of living); id. art. 26 (establishing the right to education); id. art. 27 (establishing
the right to participate in community cultural life and protection of moral interests).
11. UDHR, supra note 5, preamble.
12. See KITTY ARAMBULO, STRENGTHENING THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: THEORETICAL AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS 15 (1999) (citing U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/53, at p.9 (Dec. 10, 1947)); MORSINK, supra
note 7, at 19 (emphasizing the crucial difference between having a right and the
implementation of it).
13. See ARAMBULO, supra note 12, at 15-18.
14. F. Pr etacznik, The Social Concept of Human Rights: Its Philosophical Background
and Political Justification, in REVUE BELGE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 238-52 (1977), noted in
Matthew Craven, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 455-57 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
Craven, Committee] (explaining the Soviet states advocated that the implementation of
human rights should take place by means of state action and that international involvement
should be minimal).
15. See id. at 456 (citing U.N.G.A. Resolution 543 (VI) of 5 February 1952) (asserting
that the question of whether human rights should be implemented by means of state action
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With the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights16 (“ICCPR” or the “Civil and Political Rights Covenant”) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights17
(“ICESCR” or the “Covenant”) form the International Bill of Rights.
Though crafted in the same diplomatic process, the enforcement provisions
of the two Covenants are far from identical. The substantive provisions of
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant sound, again, like the U.S. bill of
rights; the language is unequivocal, clean statements defining unassailable
rights. Contrarily, the drafters of the ICESCR saddled it with an
enforcement clause that reads “Each State Party . . . undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assi stance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”18
This weaker language reflected the continuing opposition of many of the
western countries, most prominently the United States.19 These countries
felt deep suspicion about the desirability of elevating economic and social
policies to the level of an unalienable right rather than a personal privilege
granted or withheld through the political ordering of macroeconomic
priorities.20 This liberal (in the Lockian sense)21 ideology overlay a
or international action that led the states to draft two separate human rights covenants).
16. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (recognizing that the ideal of
free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom can only be achieved when everyone
may enjoy such freedoms).
17. 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR] (recognizing that the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom can only be achieved when economic,
social, and cultural rights are protected).
18. Id. art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
19. See Craven, Committee, supra note 14, at 456-57.
20. See id.; see also ARAMBULO, supra note 12, at [page numbers to be provided by
Lyon]. For a comprehensive review of the semi-philosophical debate over the justiciability
of economic, social and cultural rights, see id., at 53-169. Compared with the profusion of
recent attention to promoting the justiciability of ESCRs, see id. at 99-169, there appear to
be relatively few new arguments against justiciability, see id., at 53-97. One recent U.S.
example arose in the debate between Herman Schwartz and Cass Sunstein during the
revision of the Eastern European constitutions. See Cass Sunstein, Something Old,
Something New, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1992 at 18 (stating that Soviet-style
constitutions set out general social commitments rather than concrete entitlements); Cass
Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Winter 1993, at 35 (asserting
Eastern European constitutions should produce firm liberal rights and the foundation for
some kind of market economy). Only the United States continues consistently to advance
nonjusticiability as a serious proposition in the international human rights political arena.
See Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, COHRE’s Online Newsletter No. 3 (Apr.
2001), available at http://www.cohre.org/wkframe.htm (on file with author) (describing “yet
another unilateral effort” by the United States to contest the legitimacy of economic, social
and cultural rights). For recent statements of the United States to the UN Commission on
Human Rights, see Ambassador George Moose: Explanation of Position and call for a vote
on OP 8c: L.42, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Apr. 20, 2001), available at
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consensus that, as a practical matter, social conditions are simply too
complex to be capable of evaluation or promotion by any adjudicative
forum.

B. Two Attempts to Create an Effective Monitoring Body
The Committee’s turbulent institutional history demonstrates the
controversial nature of the rights it monitors. Like most human rights
treaties, including the ICCPR, the ICESCR mandates that the States Parties
to the treaty submit reports about their adherence to the instrument.22
However, the ICCPR also establishes a free-standing monitoring body, the
Human Rights Committee, to receive and consider reports.23 Each of the
four major UN human rights treaties that followed the International Bill of
Rights also established freestanding monitoring committees.24 In contrast,
the ICESCR merely orders States Parties to submit their reports to the UN
Economic and Social Council,25 leaving control of the ICESCR’s monitors
in the hands of a fully political body without guidance as to their selection
http://www.humanrights-usa.net/statements/0420L42.htm (on file with author) (noting the
U.S. government’s position that ESCRs “are not rights which create immediate, actionable
entitlements of a citizen vis-[à]-vis his or her own government”); Ambassador George
Moose, U.S. Delegation, UN Commission of Human Rights, EOV: L.12, The Right to Food
(Apr.
20,
2001),
available
at
http://www.humanrightsusa.net/statements/0420righttofood.htm (on file with author) (presenting the U.S.
government’s disagreement with the proposition that “citizens of a State have a human right
to receive food directly from the government of that State” as well as with the existence of
“a legal remedy at the national and international levels against a State for those individuals
who believe their presumed right has been denied”).
21. See LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 3-32 (defending the roots of
the term “liberal” in the Lockian philosophy of governmental non-intervention).
22. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40 (requiring state parties to submit reports
within one year of entry and upon the request of the Committee thereafter); ICESCR, supra
note 17, arts. 16-17 (requiring states to furnish reports in stages in accordance with the
Economic and Social Council within one year of entry into the covenant).
23. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 28 (consisting of 18 members, composed of state
representatives with high moral character who are elected to serve in their personal
capacity).
24. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimina tion, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 8 [hereinafter ICERD]; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 17 [hereinafter CEDAW];
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 17 [hereinafter CAT]; Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
25. See ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 17(1) at 9 (requiring state parties to furnish reports
during their first year in stages and in accordance with the Council). Interestingly, during
the “finishing touches” stage in 1966, the year the ICESCR was promulgated, the United
States proposed the establishment of an independent Committee similar to the Human
Rights Committee, and the Soviet Union rejected the proposal. See Philip Alston, Out of the
Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 338-339 (1987) [hereinafter Alston, Challenges]
(presenting arguments in support and in opposition to the creation of the Committee).
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and methods. Thus, the Committee is the only one of the six major UN
human rights treaty bodies that was not created by the terms of the human
rights treaty it monitors.
In fact, the Committee is the third entity the General Assembly has
created to monitor the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; it was established in 1985 when the first two bodies, called
the Sessional Working Group and the Sessional Working Group of
Governmental Experts, were abandoned for ineffectiveness.26 These
bodies’ impressive shortcomings included their eight-year long failure to
comment substantively on any state’s report.27
These groups also alienated the specialized agencies, particularly the
International Labour Organization (ILO),28 whose cooperation with the
Committee is particularly crucial given the extensive treatment of labor
rights in the Covenant.29
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) created the Committee by
resolution.30 The Committee consists of 18 “experts with recognized
competence in the field of human rights, serving in their personal
capacity.”31 ECOSOC elects nine members every two years, for a four year
term.32 The Committee first convened in 1987.33

III. THE COMMITTEE’S RECORD
The Committee has had more than fifteen years to define its priorities
26. See, e.g., Alston, Challenges, supra note 25, at 340-42; International Comm’n of
Jurists, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 42 INT’L COMM’N OF
JURISTS REV. 33, 33 (1989) (illustrating the process of evolution from the working group to
a committee of independent experts).
27. See Alston, Challenges, supra note 25, at 341-42 (listing the findings of the
Commission of Jurists survey of the Sessional Working Group).
28. Id. at 365-67.
29. See MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 36 (1995) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT] (quoting Philip Alston, The UN Specialised Agencies and
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 79 (1979)).
30. E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85
(1985).
31. Id.
32. Id. The Committee members elect their own officers, for two year terms. Rules of Procedure
of the Committee: .01/09/93. E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1 (Basic Reference Document) (1993), at Rule 15.

33. For helpful contemporaneous accounts of the Committee’s early operations, see
Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (1987); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, Second
Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
603 (1987); Scott Leckie, An Overview and Appraisal of the Fifth Session of the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 539 (1991).
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and establish its methods. The general consensus is that the Committee has
used relatively scant financial and political resources to good effect,34
rapidly bringing the ICESCR Covenant’s monitoring processes up to
current treaty body standards, advancing its own political fortunes, and
gaining greater general acceptance for the justiciability of economic, social
and cultural rights through careful attention to norm development.

A. Improvement and Entrenchment of the Monitoring Processes
The new Committee stepped into a failed monitoring system, and,
relatively free from procedural mandates,35 set about inventing a process
that would engage the States Parties and revive interest in economic, social
and cultural rights.36 By learning from the experiences of the existing
treaty bodies, creatively interpreting its mandate, and consistently
undertaking broader normative initiatives, the Committee quietly brought
the Covenant’s enforcement processes into line with the other UN human
rights treaties. In fact, according to a recent report on the methods of the
six treaty monitoring bodies, the Committee has moved beyond standard
practice in many respects.
1.

Leveraging Slim Resources

Professor Anne Bayefsky’s 2001 in-depth evaluation of the UN human
rights monitoring system37 provides insight into the Committee’s
34. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 102-3; ARAMBULO, supra
note 12, at 39; Leckie, supra note 33, at 546-47; John Foster, Meeting the Challenges:
Renewing the Progress of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNIV. N.B. L.REV. 197,
200 (1998); Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the
Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
161, 187 (1998).
35. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 50 (stating that the Committee
has had the power to shape its practices “in an unprecedented manner”). For example, the
ICESCR requires only that the States Parties submit reports “in accordance with a
programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council,” ICESCR, supra note 17,
art. 17.1. Only the ICCPR affords similar flexibility. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40. The
other four in-force UN human rights treaties specify the periodicity, giving their monitors
less autonomy in crafting their own solutions to the difficult problems of overdue reports
and backlogs. See ICERD, supra note 24, art. 9.1 (requiring reports one year after entry and
every two years there after); CEDAW, supra note 24, art. 18.1 (requiring reports one year
after entry into force and at least every four years there after); CAT, supra note 24, art. 19.1
(requiring reports one year after entry into force and every four years after); CRC, supra
note 24, art. 44.1 (requiring reports two years after entry into force and every five years
there after).
36. See Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 356-62 (1987)
(discussing contemporaneously the Committee’s earliest planning processes).
37. ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT
THE CROSSROADS 2 (2001).
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procedural achievements and shortcomings. The report reveals that by
most indicators the Committee has achieved parity with the other
monitoring bodies, despite being one of the lower resourced bodies.38
Monitoring economic, social and cultural rights is arguably more
resource intensive than monitoring civil and political rights, because
ESCRs implicate inter-disciplinary information that is maintained outside
the customary “justice” framework.39 Although the CESCR is not the only
UN human rights body that deals with economic, social and cultural rights,
it is the only body that deals exclusively with them. The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) and Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) deal with ESCRs40 and thus
inter-disciplinary issues, creating greater information gathering and
synthesis demands. UNICEF and UNIFEM, which can be considered
“parallel” agencies to the CRC and CEDAW, have decided that the human
rights implementation work falls within their mandates, and they have
undertaken supportive roles with their “counterpart” human rights bodies.41
UNICEF’s support to the CRC is particularly significant.42 As a result, the
CRC has more staff members than other monitoring bodies, and a strong
network of NGOs supported by UNICEF, which participates in the CRC’s
work.43
Meanwhile, the UN agency arguably most likely to be cast in the role of
a CESCR “counterpart” is the UNDP, and the UNDP has proven to be
much more cautious about becoming involved with human rights
monitoring, and the Committee has not enjoyed significant UNDP

38. Id. at 99 (mentioning that the Committee is among the three committees that offer
no remuneration to its members). This information must be taken in comparative context;
however, the three treaty bodies that do compensate their members (the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)) pay only $3000-$5000 per
year to their members. Id.
39. See ICESCR, supra note 16, arts. 18-23 (acknowledging the importance of the UN
specialized agencies to monitoring and implementing economic, social and cultural rights,
and anticipating extensive cooperation between the Committee and the specialized
agencies).
40. See, e.g., ICERD, supra note 24, art. 2(2) (noting “special measures”/affirmative
action); 5(e) (explaining non-discrimination in a range of ESCRs); CRC, supra note 24, arts.
24, 26-29, 32; CEDAW, supra note 24, art. 3 (noting “all appropriate measures”/affirmative
action); id. arts. 10-13, 16 (indicating non-discrimination in a range of economic and social
services); id. art. 14.2 (mandating a range of economic and social services for rural women).
41. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 39, 43, 49, 62.
42. See id.
43. See id. (suggesting that there does not appear to be any literature examining whether
and how a close relationship with an agency might compromise a treaty monitoring body’s
independence).
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support.44 Another example of limited resources is that the CESCR also has
a smaller complement of secretariat support staff because of its status as a
non-treaty-based body.45
2.

General Procedures and Progressive Monitoring Methodologies

In the Bayefsky report, the Committee receives generally favorable
marks vis-à-vis the other committees for its reporting practices.46 The
Committee requires that from the time of consideration of a state’s first
report, reports be submitted every five years, unless the Committee decides
to shorten the period based on factors such as the quality of the most recent
dialogue.47 This periodicity is in line with the other bodies, whose spacing
reflects a variety of arrangements, including two years48 and five years.49
The Human Rights Committee sets no specific period, retaining the ability
to set the timing for each member governments.50 Like the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) and the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the
CESCR has a two-year reporting backlog.51
All treaty monitoring regimes suffer from a significant numbers of
overdue reports.52 As of 2001, the Committee had 164 overdue reports,
falling in the middle of the situation of all the treaty bodies, which range
from 106-397.53 Although its numbers are relatively low, the Committee
has the highest percentage of States Parties with overdue reports.54 CERD
routinely considers states’ practices in the absence of a report, and CESCR,
along with the HRC, is following suit.55 The Bayefsky report notes that the
44. See id. at 49 (noting that “UNDP can be said to have a growing belief – still largely
theoretical – in the centrality of the treaty standards, and their implementation, to their
work.”) (emphasis added).
45. Craven, Committee, supra note 14, at 461.
46. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 223-236.
47. ICESCR, supra note 16, art. 17.1; E.S.C. Res. 1988/4, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1 at
Rule 58.2; CESCR Resolution, at III (2000).
48. ICERD, supra note 24, art. 9.1.
49. CRC, supra note 24, art. 44.1 (noting the period to be 5 years); CEDAW, supra
note 24, at 18.1(b) (explaining that the period is 4 years).
50. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40.1(b).
51. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 16.
52. See id. at 8-11, 469- 502.
53. Id. at 472.
54. Id. at 475.
55. See id. at 12; see, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Togo, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. ¶¶ 3, 17, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.61 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
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Committee is only body that sometimes fails to provide information in its
annual reports on the due date of the states’ overdue reports.56
The Committee’s procedures make it open to civil society participation.
Beginning in 1987 it accepted written and oral submissions by NGOs.57 In
1993 it established a formal procedure for NGO participation.58 Currently it
is one of four monitoring bodies that holds a “pre-sessional working group”
to generate the list of issues for states to answer and to encourage NGO
input.59 The Committee entertains NGO presentations in open meetings
both at its pre-sessional working group sessions and on the first day of the
session.60 The Committee benefits from the significant involvement of
international NGOs who dedicate resources to activating and supporting
domestic NGOs to participate in Committee processes through “shadow” or
“parallel” NGO reports and verbal interventions.61 The Committee also
consults with NGOs in preparation for drafting its General Comments.

and Cultural Rights: Republic of the Congo, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 22d mtg. ¶¶ 3, 24,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Solomon Islands, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 24th
mtg. ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.33 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, U.N. ESCOR,
17th Sess., 45th mtg. ¶¶ 3, 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.21 (1997); Concluding Observations
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Guinea, U.N. ESCOR, 14th
Sess., 22d mtg. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.5 (1996); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mali, U.N. ESCOR, 11th Sess., 44th
mtg. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/17 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mauritius, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 23d mtg. ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/8 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Kenya, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/6 (1993). The Bayefsky report endorses consideration in the absence of a
report in some instances. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 13.
56. See Bayefsky, supra note 37, at 114, 120.
57. Virginia Dandan, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
Non-Governmental Organizations, in THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 227, 228 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000).
58. See id. at 229.
59. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 29.
60. Id. at 43.
61. See, e.g., Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Using the UN Committee for
Economic,
Social
and
Cultural
Rights
(2001),
available
at
http://www.cohre.org/unframe.htm; Foodfirst Information Action Network, at
http://www.fian.org (providing a mission description). Other NGOs that have offered
sustained, active support to the Committee include the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Habitat
International Coalition, Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems,
International, the International Human Rights Internship Program, and the International
Commission of Jurists. See, e.g., ALLAN MCCHESNEY, PROMOTING AND DEFENDING
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK 165 (2000); ASIAN FORUM FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNSHIP
PROGRAM, CIRCLE OF RIGHTS: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM: A
TRAINING RESOURCE (2000); Dandan, supra note 57, at 229. Recently, the International
Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW), a group primarily focused on CEDAW, has
begun to participate in Committee hearings as well. Dandan, supra note 57, at 229.
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The Committee has been relatively activist in responding to emergency
situations and engaging in follow-up activities. It has undertaken two
official missions, as many as CERD and more than the other monitoring
bodies.62 The Committee is one of only two committees that currently
publishes information and conducts dialogues with States Parties between
formal sessions,63 and the only one that has published procedures for
solicitation of additional information.64
3.

Information Sharing Practices

Concluding Observations are the document in which a monitoring body
comments on individual States’ Party implementation of the relevant treaty.
In its Concluding Observations, the Committee is one of three bodies that
separate concerns from recommendations, a practice endorsed in the
Bayefsky report as strengthening the recommendations.65 The Committee
receives endorsement for being one of three Committees whose annual
reports lists the NGOs that participated in its proceedings,66 one of four that
lists reports received from states,67 and one of three that always provides
lists of reports that have been considered.68 The report also endorses the
Committee for being the only monitoring body that directly documents
follow-up activities to consideration of states’ reports,69 as well as for being
the only body that routinely provides information on its working methods.70
The report also critiques some of the Committee’s reporting
methodologies, noting that the Committee is one of four monitoring bodies
that do not reproduce comments received from governments on concluding
observations71 and one of only two that do not refer to the existence of such
responses at all.72 The Committee is one of three bodies that do not provide
the names of the country rapporteurs,73 and one of three that publish no
information regarding the activities of the committee members between

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 92-93.
See id. at 73.
Id.
See id. at 63.
See id. at 113.
See id.
See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 113.
See id. at 113, 119-120.
See id. at 113, 119.
See id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 113, 119.
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sessions.74 The Committee is one of five committees that decided to
discontinue publishing a summary of its dialogue with governments.75 The
Committee receives relatively high marks from the report for the quantity
of information accessible through the Internet.76
4.

Bias

The Bayefsky report documents a lack of even treatment of similarly
situated states in all the monitoring bodies’ concluding observations.77
Bayefsky negatively refers to the Committee’s decision to interact with
Israel between sessions.78
The Bayefsky report points out many factors contributing to political
bias in all the treaty bodies,79 including the fact that that membership on a
monitoring body is a part-time occupation,80 and also that at least of 48% of
the members serving on the committees have been “employed in some
capacity by their governments.”81 This raises particularly direct and explicit
concerns about the politicization of the CERD,82 but also raise concerns
about the CESCR as well. The CESCR and the other three committees that
do not consider individual complaints have the highest percentage of
government employee members.83
The report notes that other committees are in the forefront in creating
mechanisms to ensure equitable geographical distribution in its leadership
and subgroupings (such as, for example, membership on pre-sessional
working groups), an issue of particular interest in a post-colonial analysis.84
An analysis of committee memberships reveals that the Committee
currently has the highest percentage of “tri-continental” members amongst
74. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 113.
75. Id. at 113. CEDAW is the only body that provides any record of the oral
discussions, and it publishes only a summary of the government’s opening statement, which
is critiqued as “add[ing] very little to the written record.” Id.
76. See id. at 122-23 (listing documents that should be added to the web; for CESCR,
the only omission noted is the list of biographical information for candidates to Committee
membership).
77. See id. at 63 (stating that “political bias is sometimes evident in the differential
depth of treatment of some states”) (parenthetical omitted).
78. See id. at 73 (discussing the first instance of the committee’s using new procedures
for additional information requests).
79. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 99-102.
80. Id. at 99.
81. Id. at 100.
82. See id. at 63 (stating that “the absence of discernable factual grounds for the
differential treatment . . . is most evident in the concluding observations of CERD”).
83. Id. at 100.
84. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 101.
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all the committees. The Committee has had four Chairpersons: Ibrahim Ali
Badawi El Sheikh (1987-1990, Egypt), Valeri I. Kouznetsov (1990-1991,
Russian Federation), Philip Alston (1991-1998, Australia) and Virginia
Bonoan-Dandan (1999-present, Philippines). The CESCR is also one of
four committees whose membership includes fewer than twenty percent
women.85

B. Contributions To Justiciability
The Committee has worked hard to rescue economic, social and cultural
rights from historical and political obscurity, and to overcome the nonjusticiability critique that bedevils this body of rights. The Committee’s
efforts include development of the norms contained within the Covenant,
elaboration of a draft option protocol for an individual complaints
mechanism, promotion of progressive pronouncements by the UN Charterbased bodies, and attention to domestic justiciability.
1.

Norm Development

The Committee focused early efforts on establishing that the Covenant
does contain immediately enforceable obligations. Its first General
Comment, issued in 1989, discussed the importance of “specific benchmarks” to the evaluation of States Parties’ progress.86 Its third General
Comment was entitled “The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Article
2(1), Paragraph I, of the Covenant).”87 In this document the Committee laid
out an interpretation of Article 2(1) that made a strong case for the duty to
take immediate action on all the Covenant provisions,88 and the duty to
immediately implement several of the Covenant obligations.89
85. Id. The two Committees with higher female representation are the CEDAW and the
CRC. Id.
86. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 1
– Reporting by states parties, in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 14, ¶¶ 6-7 (2001).
87. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3
- The nature of States parties’ obligations (art. 2, ¶ 1, of the Covenant), in Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies,
5th
Sess.,
U.N.
Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5,
at
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/epcomm3.htm (2001) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 3].
88. See id. at www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/epcomm3.htm ¶¶ 2 & 9. See also
CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 128 (saying that “states therefore
cannot make do with rights ‘on the cheap.’”). Check this.
89. General Comment No. 3, supra note 87, at 18 (2001). See also CRAVEN,
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 135 (suggesting articles 3, 18, 13(3) and
15(3)).
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The Committee’s General Comments are its most important contribution
to the elaboration of the substantive provisions of the Covenant.90 Most of
the General Comments contain detailed discussions about the content of
particular obligations, including the right to housing,91 education,92 food,93
and health.94 Two of the General Comments center on vulnerable
populations: persons with disabilities95 and older persons.96 One General
Comment examines the issue of economic sanctions.97
2.

Optional Protocol

Perhaps the most powerful indicator of justiciability is the opportunity
for individuals to vindicate their rights through a complaints process. The
Committee has been working to promote the promulgation of an optional
protocol to the Covenant to establish such a procedure. Currently amongst
90. See generally Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001).
91. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 4 - The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), in Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 22 (2001); U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7 - The right to adequate
housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant): forced evictions, in Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 16th
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 49 (2001) [hereinafter General Comment 7].
92. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 11 - Plans of action for primary education (art. 14), in Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 20th
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 63 (2001); U.N. Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13 - The right to education (art. 13), in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 74 (2001).
93. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 12 - The right to adequate food (art. 11), in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 66 (2001).
94. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 14 - The right to the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12), in Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 90 (2001).
95. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 5 – Persons with disabilities, in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 28 (2001).
96. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 6 – The economic, social and cultural rights of older persons, in Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 13th
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 38 (2001).
97. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 8 – The relationship of economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural
rights, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 54 (2001).
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the UN monitoring bodies, the HRC, CAT, CERD and CEDAW decide
contentious petitions.98 In 1997, after extensive consultations in Committee
sessions and at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights,99 the Committee
submitted a draft optional protocol to the Commission on Human Rights.100
However, to date the Commission has used dilatory tactics to stall the
measure, repeatedly returning the issue to the Secretariat for further
discussions and clarifications despite the fact that relatively few
governments have even chosen to comment on the draft.101 In 2001, the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights held an expert consultation
“directed to working through remaining issues and obstacles to the
adoption [of the Protocol],”102 which demonstrates that the Committee
remains committed to pressing for this important implementation measure.
The Committee has also consistently used the reporting process to
encourage governments to support the optional protocol.103
3.

Domestic Enforcement

In addition to its nascent follow-up procedures and missions, the
Committee has also worked for domestic enforcement of the Covenant
through attention to the legal status of ESCRs at the national level. Its
ninth General Comment, “The Domestic Application of the Covenant,104
98. See Andrew Byrnes, An Effective Complaints Procedure in the Context of
International Human Rights Law, in THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY
139, 140 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000) (remarking on HRC, CAT & CERD contentious case
jurisdiction); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, U.N. Doc. G/A Res. A/54/4 (October 6, 1999) (noting CEDAW
contentious case jurisdiction).
99. For a detailed description of the reasoning and conclusions reached at Utrecht, see
ARAMBULO, supra note 12, at 201-357.
100. Id. at 160 (citing Report of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
to the Commission on Human Rights on a Draft Optional Protocol for the Consideration of
Communications Concerning Non-Compliance with the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/105 (18 Dec. 1996), 5
International Human Rights Reports (1998)).
101. See id. at 161-162.
102. See Workshop on the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, With
Particular Reference to an Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Palais Wilson, 5-6 Feb. 2001), at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/
escrwkshop.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).
103. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.68 (2001) (praising change of position vis-à-vis the Optional Protocol);
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Mexico, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 (1999) (praising position
on Optional Protocol).
104. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 9 –
The Domestic Application of the Covenant, in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc.
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reiterates its earlier justiciability interpretations and sets forth the
international law requirements mandating recognition of the Covenant as
binding law in the domestic legal order of States Parties.105 The Committee
tracks this issue in the reporting process as well.106
IV. “POST-COLONIAL” IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE’S WORK
The following analysis of the Committee’s work highlights aspects
relevant to three themes found in the literature of post-colonial theory and
expressed at the conference for which this article was produced. Postcolonial theorists work to: 1) explore the problematic historical legacy of
modern international intervention in the developing world, 2) expose the
currently discriminatory aspects of international action vis-à-vis southern
states, and 3) give voice to the most oppressed people.107 The Committee’s
work is responsive to these concerns in that its message to the developing
world often contradicts that of the international financial community, and
because its reporting procedure jurisprudence has reflected a relatively
even-handed treatment of north and south. At the same time, the
Committee cannot escape some long-standing criticisms of the human
rights regime in that it condemns certain cultural customs, and that it has
insufficient resources to ensure the participation and follow -up that would
make its work meaningful to the most disenfranchised of the millions of
people who are supposed to be affected by its mandate.

HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 58 (2001).
105. Id. at 59 ¶ 4.
106. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Armenia, 21st Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.39 (1999)
(reporting a failure to clarify status of the covenant under Armenian law); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Iceland, 20th
Sess., 20th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.32 (1999) (noting a certain complacency
with respect to the non-incorporation of the Covenant in domestic legislation); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Bulgaria, 21st
Sess., 50th-51st mtg. at ¶¶ 34, 36, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999) (requesting the state
party to ensure the wide dissemination of Covenant and Concluding Observations).
107. These are of necessity imaginarily concrete post-colonial “concerns.” As a branch
of post-modernism, post-coloniality does not lend itself to the absolutes that drive human
rights discourse. “Indeterminacy seems to abide forever. Postcoloniality is, for some,
whatever you want to make of it that will allow individual compromises and opportunisms
to flourish.” E. SAN JUAN, JR., BEYOND POSTCOLONIAL THEORY 2 (1998). Similar concerns
have been registered by writers attempting to reconcile the “static character” of human
rights language with the discourse of international development, in which “[a]ll is up for
reconsideration as contexts and possibilities change.” Henry J. Steiner, Social Rights and
Economic Development: Converging Discourses?, 4 BUFF. H. RTS. L. REV. 25, 41 (1998).
See also UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000
19 (2000).
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A. De-Mining the Social Spending Arena
One of the primary projects of postcolonial theory is to examine
colonialism and show the extent to which modern arrangements remain
colonial in origins and effect.108 Many scholars have also taken up the
specific project of exposing the colonial and racist historical roots of
contemporary international law,109 international law reform,110 international
human rights,111 and international financial institutions.112 This literature
provides a rich source for constructing the Committee’s colonial “legacy.”
The Committee’s subject matter implies a unique legacy, one that holds
lessons for the Committee’s future methods and priorities.
Specifically, the work of examining developing countries’
macroeconomic and social spending policies places international
Committee squarely in a realm where post-colonial north-on-south
inter vention and manipulation have been perhaps the most blatant and
comprehensive.113 Colonialism was to a great extent an extractive
108. See LEELA GANDHI, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7-8
(1998); YOUNG, supra note 4, at 4.
109. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 10-22 (1999). See also
Annelise Riles, The View from the International Plane: Perspective and Scale in the
Architecture of Colonial International Law, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 127, 127-38
(Eve Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999).
110. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance
in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 904-08 (2000); Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed
States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 903, 926-46
(1997); Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an InsiderOutsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841, 851 (2000); see Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical
Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against
Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 877, 909-29 (2000); see also YOUNG, supra note
108, at 59.
111. See Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589, 597,
617 (1996); Riles, supra note 109, at 131; Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 2, at 1,
10.
112. See Padideh Ala’i, A Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some Preliminary
Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. REV. 537, 540 (2001); see also Antony Anghie,
Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the
Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. POL. 243, 253 (2000) [hereinafter Anghie,
Globalization, IFIs and the Third World] (noting that World Bank and International
Monetary Fund programs sometimes violate social and economic rights); Jeannine Purdy,
Postcolonialism: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 212-13 (Eve
Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999) (noting that violence in Trinidad and Tobago
coincided with International Monetary Fund intervention); Dianne Otto, Subalternity and
International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of
Difference, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 155 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds.,
1999) (suggesting that the establishment of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was an effort by western interests to keep
economic “questions” away from the control of the United Nations General Assembly).
113. See PANOS MOURDOUKOUTAS, THE GLOBAL CORPORATION: THE DECOLONIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 19 (1999) (noting that many historians and economists support
the notion that the colonial period was an extractive enterprise dedicated to making the raw
human and material resources of the colonized world available to the colonizing
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enterprise dedicated to making the raw human and material resources of the
colonized world available to the colonizing economies.114 The period 18751947 was characterized by falling transport costs, “physical integration of
world markets”115 and the expansion of international law.116 As a result,
the period 1913-1947 was an age of economic “multinationalism,”
involving low trade barriers and “weak government.”117 The colonial
powers used their control over southern government functions to achieve
international economic integration. Concurrent with relinquishment of
direct political control over the African and Asian colonies, the
multinational corporation arose118 and facilitated continuing action in the
global south by northern-controlled business interests, despite the increased
trade barriers and diversity of trading partners that characterized the
immediate post-colonial period.119
The implication is that extraction has continued unabated. Certainly
there is little evidence that the colonial powers devoted serious attention or
resources to poverty reduction or general welfare measures in the colonies
until shortly before decolonization.120
The trade and power imbalance the former colonies brought to the new
dynamic did not go unremarked. The global south banded together to
sponsor a series of initiatives in the United Nations urging that the
economies). The height of the colonial period, 1875-1947, was a period characterized by
falling transport costs and “physical integration of world markets.” Id.
114. See, e.g., FIELDHOUSE, supra note 4, at 75, 77, 81-82 (noting aspects of colonial rule
such as low attention to colonial affairs by the larger colonizing governments and belated
attention to ameliorative development measures as opposed to resource extraction and
corporate interests). Fieldhouse also provides a useful survey of the integrated world
economy “optimists,” id. at 9, and “pessimists,” id. at 32. Marx termed colonialism as
Europe’s period of “primitive accumulation.” Id. at 42-43 (quoting KARL MARX, CAPITAL
751 (1867)). See also Catherine Couquery Vidrovitch, Les Conditions de la Dépendance:
Histoire de Sous-Developpement, in DECOLONISATIONS & NOUVELLES DEPENDANCES:
MODELES ET CONTRE-MODELES IDEOLOGIQUES ET CUTURELS DANS LE TIERS-MONDE 33
(Catherine Couquery Vidrovitch & Alain Forest eds., 1986) (rooting colonialism’s legacy in
the “économie de pillage”).
115. MOURDOUKOUTAS, supra note 113, at 19. This integration included the forced
introduction of inappropriate technologies and commodification of national resources.
TRAN VAN DINH, INDEPENDENCE, LIBERATION, REVOLUTION: AN APPROACH TO THE
UNDERSTANDING OF THE THIRD WORLD 211 (1987).
116. See Riles, supra note 109, at 129 (describing a “flurry of activity” to develop
international law in the late nineteenth century).
117. MOURDOUKOUTAS, supra note 113, at 16.
118. See FIELDHOUSE, supra note 4, at 256 (noting “the great leap forwards” in foreign
direct investment after the second world war).
119. Id. at 35-38. See also YOUNG, supra note 108, at 47 (arguing that trade agreements
and the western dominated IFIs, inter alia, “all [had] the effect of maintaining control”).
120. See, e.g., FIELDHOUSE, supra note 4, at 86 (noting that the British empire’s first
attempt to underwrite domestic poverty-reducing expenditures took place in 1940). But see
FIELDHOUSE, supra note 4, at 317 (stating that Japan made significant investments into
Taiwanese and Korean education and health care).
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independence-era vision of trade between equals be made reality. Political
battles broke out over the rights of multinationals with respect to their host
developing country governments. The New International Economic Order,
or N.I.E.O., was formally adopted by the UN in a series of resolutions in
1974 and 1975.121 It came to represent a bundle of southern government
actions that included increased trade barriers and expropriation of
multinational assets at the national level, along with the fight for increased
north-south trade concessions and aid at the international level.122
Another key feature of post-war north-south economic relations was the
international financial institutions (IFIs), most importantly the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These institutions have actively
sought macroeconomic reform across the global south, reform that
facilitates the operations of multinational corporations and international
trade.123 These agencies have also routinely advocated that southern
governments reduce their social spending and re-tool production to service
international markets, policies that have been widely condemned for
producing high social costs, particularly in the short term.124
Thus the Committee is treading on sensitive historical ground to the
extent that it assigns “blame” for poverty on poor governments. If the true
value added of any supranational institution is to identify and provide
support for replication of best practices, what does it mean for a country to
slash its social welfare system by IMF mandate, engage in big development

121. See DINH, supra note 115, at 203; Philip Alston, The Basic Working Paper:
Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy, in
DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 31, 83 (1981) [hereinafter Alston,
Development and the Rule of Law].
122. See Douglas Williams, Human Rights and Economic Development, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 26, 27 (1978).
123. See Anghie, Globalization, IFIs, and the Third World, supra note 112, at 257-258.
124. See, e.g., The IMF Formula: Prescription for Poverty, in INTERNATIONAL FORUM
ON GLOBALIZATION, IFG BULLETIN, Volume 1, Issue 1, 8 (2001) (excerpted from
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION, DOES GLOBALIZATION HELP THE POOR?
(2001)). See also Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Income Distribution and the
Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social Development, 6
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 31 & n.177 (1996) (noting that some IMF reports
have criticized Structural Adjustment Programs (SSAPs)). The social critique of structural
adjustment is by no means uncontroversial. Id. Carrasco and Kose argue that claims of
worsened income distribution resulting from SSAPs are “only partially borne out,” while
also noting the World Bank’s own recent publications on poverty and growing civil society
attention to scrutinizing the IFIs. Id. at 31-32. Interestingly, when the World Bank issued a
comprehensive report on poverty, stories surfaced about last minute revisions to the text
owing to struggles over how to portray the impact of market oriented reforms on poverty.
See, e.g., James Cox, Poor Nations Just Getting Poorer: Controversial Poverty Report
Urges Growth and Equality, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2000, at 5B; Steven Pearlstein, World
Bank Rethinks Poverty; Report Finds Traditional Approach Fails, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
2000, at E1. Reportedly, the chief author of the report resigned after U.S. and European
officials reportedly demanded that he put more emphasis on economic growth and freemarket policies as ways to alleviate poverty. See Cox, supra note 124.
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projects at the urging of the World Bank, and lower trade barriers pursuant
to the WTO, only be condemned by a UN human rights committee for any
resulting intensification of hunger, ill health and displacement? And in this
context, how can the international human rights community constructively
identify and address the very real contributions to poverty by national
governments?
The Committee has found some satisfactory answers to these questions.
First, it has been critical of IFI policies and interventions. The Committee
has begun to engage the IFIs and to work more closely with its States
Parties to counter to the liberal international financial mandate enforced
throughout the international community. The Committee is urged to
continue and expand this mandate, to maximize appropriate attention to
poverty alleviation by international financial institutions and corporations,
the bodies that have been called the “loci of real power exertion.”125
1.

Committee’s Statements on Globalization

The Committee’s limited interventions into the debate on globalization
and structural adjustment are, from the point of view of the northern
countries, its most controversial work.126 The northern countries give the
institutional rationale that human rights should deal with relationships
between governments and individuals, not relationships between
governments. Meanwhile, the human rights community is attempting to
expose the relationship between the northern governments and people in
the countries that are victims of improperly planned and implemented
development projects and foreign direct investment.
a.

External Debt

The Committee’s jurisprudence reveals some convergence between the
Committee’s interpretation of the Covenant and the anti-poverty agenda of
global southern civil society. The Committee routinely touches on
globalization issues in its concluding observations regarding member
125. Hans-Otto Sano, Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial
Integration of Human Rights and Development, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 734, 752 (2000).
Interestingly, the activists who worked to revive the international economic, social and
cultural rights enforcement regime began their campaign using the language of the N.I.E.O.
See, e.g., Alston, Development and the Rule of Law, supra note 121, at 97.
126. A recent example of north-south split on this issue was the UN Commission on
Human Rights vote on a resolution addressing the effects of structural adjustment policies
and foreign debt on the full enjoyment of ESCRs. See UN Press Release, 57th Session,
Commission on Human Rights Adopts Resolutions on Right to Food, Unilateral Coercive
Measures, Foreign Debt, Adequate Housing, Education, and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
(Apr.
20,
2001),
found
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/9264BBAA8CD8A618C1256A380027
43AE?opendocument (on file with author).

7/15/2004 12:05 PM

3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078

2002]

DISCOURSE IN DEVELOPMENT

23

states’ compliance with the Covenant. In most instances, these comments
assume a link between debt burdens and structural adjustment and the
exacerbation of poverty. For example, the Committee has noted the
negative ESCR consequences of external debt servicing for Algeria,127
Cameroon,128 the Republic of Congo,129 Honduras,130 Jamaica,131
Kyrgyzstan,132 Mexico,133 the Philippines,134 Paraguay,135 Senegal,136 the
Solomon Islands,137 the Sudan,138 and Syria.139 The Committee should build
127. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/17
(1995).
128. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Cameroon, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.40
(1999).
129. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Republic of the Congo, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000).
130. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Honduras, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.57
(2001).
131. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Jamaica, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 85th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.75
(2001).
132. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Kyrgyzstan, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49
(2000).
133. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41
(1999) (noting that Mexico’s reduction of its foreign debt had “create[d] an environment
conducive to a more effective implementation of the rights under the Covenant”);
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/16 (1994) (listing
“considerable foreign indebtedness” among “difficulties severely affect[ing] the most
vulnerable segments of society”).
134. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Philippines, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 14th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/7
(1995).
135. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Paraguay, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.1
(1996).
136. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 48th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/18
(1994).
137. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Solomon Islands, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 24th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.33 (1999).
138. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Sudan, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.48
(2000).
139. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001).

3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078

24

7/15/2004 12:05 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 10:3

on these observations by polling industrialized governments about their
positions on debt relief and urging them to use their influence to bring
about meaningful debt relief.
b.

International Financial Institutions

The UN human rights community is in the process of evaluating and
identifying a role for itself vis-à-vis the international financial institutions.
In 1999, the Commission on Human Rights created the Open-Ended
Working Group on Structural Adjustment Programmes and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights to “elaborate basic policy guidelines on
structural adjustment programmes and economic, social and cultural rights
which could serve as a basis for a continued dialogue between human
rights bodies and the international financial institutions.”140 As of the
working group’s fourth session in February 2001, it had undertaken
numerous consultations and no action had been taken.141
The Working Group’s recommendations could be an important step
toward expanding the Committee’s influence on aid spending and structural
adjustment. The Committee has taken some preliminary actions as well. In
2000, the Committee Chairperson addressed a letter to the President of the
World Bank and the Director-General of the IMF proposing a dialogue to
explore the use of human rights and the Covenant in the Poverty Reduction
Strategy process.142 Both institutions responded affirmatively.143 In a
140. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Open-ended Working Group on Structural
Adjustment Programmes and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Note by the
Secretariat, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/53 (2000).
141. See, e.g., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Open-ended Working Group on
Structural Adjustment Programmes and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Note by the
Secretariat, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 138, ¶¶ 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/53 (2000) (stating that at its third session, the working group
took action only to elect a Chairperson and agree on holding a further session in spring
2001); Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Open-ended working group on structural
adjustment programmes and economic, social and cultural rights: Note by the secretariat,
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/57 (2001) (stating that at its fourth session, the Commission decided to
postpone the working group session, because of the “numerous consultations held”).
142. Letter from the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights addressed to the President of the World Bank and to the Director-General of the
International Monetary Fund, (Sept. 7, 2000) U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Report on the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions,
Annex VI, at 162-B, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22, E/C.12/2000/21.
143. See Letter from the President of the World Bank, in reply to the letter from the
Chairperson of the Committee, Social, and Cultural Rights (Sept. 26, 2000), U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Report on the Twenty-Second,
Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, Annex VI, at 164, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22,
E/C.12/2000/21 (2001); see also Letter dated 14 November 2000 from the Director-General
of the International Monetary Fund, in reply to the letter from the Chairperson of the
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change from the early days of the Committee’s work,144 in recent
Committee sessions both the IMF and the World Bank have participated as
observers.145 Because the Committee encourages NGO participation in its
information gathering, the Committee’s interactions with the IFIs could be
an important source of grass-roots information for the lending
institutions.146
The Committee posted on its website a series of papers presented at a
spring 2001conference on globalization, addressing a range of areas that
could inform norm development and practical monitoring strategies by the
Committee. The subjects included global economic governance and
national autonomy,147 economics,148 gender equality and globalization,149
trade and human rights,150 as well as the International Monetary Fund.151
This is the only posting of its kind on the Committee’s website,
demonstrating engagement with the issue of globalization.

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Report on the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth
Sessions, Annex VI, at 165, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22, E/C.12/2000/21 (2001).
144. See CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 17, at 79 (noting that only the
ILO, UNESCO, WHO and FAO attended any of the first nine sessions of the Committee).
145. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Report on the TwentySecond, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, U.N. ESCOR, at ¶ 8, E/2001/22, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2000/21 (2001) (stating that regional financial institutions have not
participated).
146. See, e.g., Carrasco & Kose, supra note 124, at 45 (stating that the IMF is “virtually
unreachable by civil society”).
147. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in
Cooperation with the High Council for International Cooperation (France), 25th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2001/6 (2001).
148. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in
cooperation with the High Council for International Cooperation (France), 25th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/8 (2001).
149. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in
cooperation with the High Council for International Cooperation (France), 25th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/4 (2001).
150. See Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in
cooperation with the High Council for International Cooperation (France), 25th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/WP.2 (2001).
151. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in the Development Activities of International Institutions” organized in
cooperation with the High Council for International Cooperation (France), 25th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/WP.5 (2001).

3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078

26

7/15/2004 12:05 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 10:3

To date, the UN human rights community has been frankly critical of the
IFI’s lynchpin programming. The UN Special Rapporteur on the
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in a report that
despite some improvements in the design of structural adjustment
programs, these programs “continue to have a daunting effect on human
rights upon the capacities of legal regimes with obligation to fulfill and
respect these rights” neither fully protect[] the most vulnerable” nor
“actually . . . decrease[] levels of impoverishment.”152 A 2000 joint report
by the Independent Expert on Structural Adjustment Policies and the
Special Rapporteur on the Effects of Foreign Debt on the full enjoyment of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights cited the “tortured history of debt
relief for poor countries”153 forcefully linking poverty and structural
adjustment programs and calling for debt relief.154
The Committee occasionally cites IFI-produced statistics155 and urges
States Parties to reach out to IFIs for technical assistance.156 But from the
Committee’s point of view, perhaps the most significant aspect of the IFIs
is their effect, for good or ill, on poverty. The Committee has
acknowledged negative consequences of both internally and externally
imposed structural adjustment policies, including privatization, in Algeria,
Argentina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras,
Korea, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Romania, Senegal, the Solomon

152. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report Submitted
by Danilo Türk, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at
41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992).
153. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Note by the Secretariat, Submitted by the
Independent Expert on Structural Adjustment Policies and the Special Rapporteur on the
Effects of Foreign Debt on the Full Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 10, Exec. Summ., U.N.
E/CN.4/2000/51 (2000).
154. Id. ¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/51 (2000); see also Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Effects of structural adjustment policies on the full enjoyment of human
rights: Report by the Independent Expert, Mr. Fantu Cheru, submitted in accordance with
Commission decisions 1998/102 and 1997/103, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 55th
Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/50 (1999).
155. E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mongolia, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.47
(2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Nigeria, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 9th mtg. at ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23
(1998). Both the Committee and commentators point to the importance of the international
financial institutions in developing indicators useful to the Committee’s work. See CRAVEN,
ICESCR, supra note 29, at 78 (citing remarks at the Committee’s sixth session, U.N. Doc.
E/1992/23, Chap. VII, 81-86, ¶¶ 332-51, Supp. (No. 3) (1992)).
156. E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mongolia, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.47
(2000); Concluding Observations: Report on the Technical Assistance Mission to Panama of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., at ¶ 81,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/8 (1995).
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Islands, and Venezuela.157 In the case of Mauritius, the Committee
endorsed the structural adjustment as successful and ESCR-protective.158
The Committee pointed out in its Concluding Observations relating to
Azerbaijan the necessity of transparency in the privatization process.159
When reviewing the record of Belarus, the Committee noted that
international aid was being withheld because of the government’s failure to
introduce certain legal and economic reforms,160 and at least implicitly
endorsed this condition with the statement that “[m]any of the country’s
present economic and social difficulties show the need to expedite
economic reforms and to build up democratic institutions based on the
157. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 81st mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.71
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Argentina, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 52d mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.38
(1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Bulgaria, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 50th-51st mtgs. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Cameroon, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.40 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Colombia, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 85th-86th mtgs. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.74 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Egypt, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.44 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: El Salvador, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.4 (1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Honduras, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.57 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Republic of Korea, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.59 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Nepal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 55th mtg. at ¶ 34, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.66 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Netherlands, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 28th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.25 (1998); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Nicaragua, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/14 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Romania, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 25th-26th mtgs. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1994/4 (1994); Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.62 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶¶ 5, 7, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/18 (1993); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Solomon Islands, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 24th mtg. at ¶¶ 10, 20,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.33 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Venezuela, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 23d mtg. at ¶ 8,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.56 (2001).
158. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mauritius, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 23d mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/8
(1994).
159. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Azerbaijan, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.20
(1997).
160. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Belarus, U.N. ESCOR, 15th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.7/Rev.1 (1996).

3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078

28

7/15/2004 12:05 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 10:3

principles of the rule of law.”161
The Committee interprets the Covenant to require reform measures
protective of vulnerable populations who might be negatively impacted by
structural adjustment,162 and has commended the efforts of several States
Parties to supplement structural adjustment programming with mitigating
social spending.163 In some cases the Committee has recommended specific
protective reforms.164 To date, the Committee’s concern appears to have
been centered on the presence or absence of any type of IFI ameliorative
social programming; the Committee has not commented on the extent or
effectiveness or publicized existing critiques165 of these programs.
In recent years, the Committee has begun to urge States Party to take
their Covenant obligations into account when negotiating with IFIs.166 The
161. Id.
162. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Guinea, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.5
(1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/16
(1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Nicaragua, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/14
(1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Kenya, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/6 (1993).
163. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/17
(1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Suriname, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 27th mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/6
(1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Morocco, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 26th-27th mtgs. at ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1994/5 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Uruguay, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1994/3 (1994).
164. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Morocco, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., 82d mtg. at ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.55
(2000) (recommending adoption of “safety nets”); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Bulgaria, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess.,
50th-51st mtgs. at ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999) (recommending socially
protective alterations to “economic reform programmes” ); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess.,
58th mtg. at ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/17 (1995) (recommending “continuous
assess[ments]” of economic reforms and “special priority” for ameliorative social policies);
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Morocco, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 26th-27th mtgs. at ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/5
(1994) (recommending adoption of “a system of taxation favoring direct and progressive
taxes and the extension of the social security system”).
165. For examples of such criticisms, see Bharati Sadasivam, The Impact of Structural
Adjustment on Women: A Governance and Human Rights Agenda, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 630,
646 (1997) (although adjustment lending has increasingly included social spending, the
projects tend to be temporary and fail to reform domestic social spending institutions);
Sheila Smith, The Social Dimensions of Structural Adjustment: A Change of Direction or a
Figleaf?, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND CRISIS IN AFRICA: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES (1992).
166. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Nepal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 55th mtg. at ¶ 38, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.66 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
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Committee also presses donor countries to use their sway with the IFIs to
increase social spending.167 Reflecting the lack of resources and the general
standard in treaty monitoring body concluding observations,168 the
Committee’s statement regarding relations with IFIs have the feel of rote
language and include no detail suggesting specific priorities or mechanisms
to follow in these negotiations. A recent statement urged a State Party to
integrate ESCRs into its draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,169
reflecting growing attention to the IFI negotiation process.
This is a positive direction for the Committee to take. Developing
country governments have notoriously weak hands in negotiations with
international financial institutions,170 and need more leverage if they are to
and Cultural Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 29, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001); Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Ukraine, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.65 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Georgia, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 21st mtg. at ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.42 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Jordan, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶ 28, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.46 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Morocco, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., 82d mtg. at ¶ 38, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.55 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 34, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.41 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Bulgaria, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 50th-51st mtgs. at ¶ 24, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999); see also Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Republic of Korea, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 12,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.59 (2001) (expressing “concern” that Korean government does not
negotiate with IFIs in a manner protective of ESCRs); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Egypt, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 26th
mtg. at ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.44 (2000) (expressing “regret[]” that Egyptian
government does not negotiate with IFIs in a manner protective of ESCRs); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Morocco, U.N.
ESCOR, 24th Sess., 82d mtg. at ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.55 (2000) (expressing
“regret[]” that Moroccan government does not negotiate with IFIs in a manner protective of
ESCRs). In a recent session with the government of Korea, the first question put to the
government in the public session was whether the government had raised its Covenant
obligations in its negotiations with the IMF. Summary record of the second part (public)* of
the 12th meeting : Republic of Korea , at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/SR.12 (2002).
167. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.68
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Italy, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 23d mtg. at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.43 (2000).
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Sweden, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70 (2001); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Finland, U.N.
ESCOR, 24th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.52 (2000).
168. BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 62.
169. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62
(2001).
170. See Anghie, Globalization, IFIs and the Third World, supra note 109, at 243, 256;
Rajesh Swaminathan, Note, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case
for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161,
214 (1998).

3824-TEXT.NATIVE.1089918078

30

7/15/2004 12:05 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 10:3

move the IFIs toward greater attention to poverty alleviation. As the
Committee pursues discussions with the IFIs, its recommendations to
member states should become increasingly specific and meaningful.
Having taken the all-important decision to refer to structural adjustment
programming and negotiations, an additional useful step will be for the
Committee to begin to routinely inquire into issues relating to IFI
negotiations171 and even, to the extent possible, time its reporting process to
make its actions and suggestions relevant for immediately upcoming
negotiation events. Growing civil society attention to the international
financial institutions172 offers a source of information for the Committee to
access specific concerns about financing and projects.
With these recommendations, the author may diverge from the
monolithic “postcolonial theory concerns” imagined in this paper. Anghie
acknowledges the unrealized potential for the international financial
institutions to contribute to poverty reduction, but at the same time cautions
that this contribution would form part of “an endless dynamic of
intervening in, and reforming, the recalcitrant third world state in all its
dimensions.”173 The question might rest on whether the Committee merely
assists States’ Parties to defend their own economic, social and cultural
rights and obligations in their dealings with the IFIs, or whether it attempts
to influence IFIs to adopt and expand upon the World Bank’s recent
practice174 of conditioning aid on commitments to social spending.175 The
Committee should come down on this issue in the most principled manner
available to it: an informed evaluation of the actual impact on ESCR
doctrine and implementation of the World Bank’s social spending
171. Currently, the Committee’s reporting guidelines include no questions about
international financial institutions. See Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content
of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties:
Report of the Secretary-General, at 5-25, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1 (2001). Only the Committee
on the Rights of the Child includes an inquiry into international financial institutions and
development aid in its reporting guidelines. Id. at 57, ¶ 21.
172. See Dr. Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization: The Case of the World
Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399, 401 (2001). For example, the author is not aware of
an instance in which the Committee has made reference in its Concluding Observations to
the World Bank Inspection Panel process. Increased academic attention to the distributional
effects of the international financial institutions has expanded accessibility of specific
recommendations regarding IFI policies. See, e.g., Carrasco & Kose, supra note 124, at 44
(recommending specific types of statistical research needed from the Bank to improve its
ability to contribute to redistribution).
173. See Anghie, Globalization, IFIs and the Third World, supra note 109, at 287-288.
174. See Carrasco & Kose, supra note 124, at 44.
175. For an interesting discussion proposing that the international legal responsibilities
of the IFIs correspond to the unique body of international treaty obligations undertaken by
each country with which the IFI is working, see Daniel Bradlow & Claudio Grossman,
Limited Mandates and intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the
IMF, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 411, 428 n.63 (1995).
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conditioning activities to date.
c.

Overseas Development Aid

The Committee also occasionally urges donor States’ Party to increase
their development assistance spending,176 and praises governments that
show a high commitment to giving.177 In a recent “Concluding
Observation”, the Committee took the further step of documenting the
percentage of the overseas development aid “devoted to areas related to the
rights contained in the Covenant.”178 As another key source of resources for
the protection of economic, social and cultural rights, the content and
distribution of overseas development aid is worthy of expanded attention.
d.

Trade Relations

Although the Committee works more closely with the ILO than with any
other agency179 and devotes a good deal of attention to labor issues in its
monitoring activities,180 human rights issues relating to international trade
176. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Finland, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶¶ 13, 23, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.52 (2000); see also Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Philippines, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 29th mtg. at ¶ 24, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1995/7 (1995) (stating generally the need for more ODA “social adjustment
programmes”).
177. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Japan, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 56th mtg. at ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.67
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Denmark, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.34
(1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Ireland, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 25th-26th mtgs. at ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.35 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Finland, U.N. ESCOR, 15th Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.8 (1996).
178. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Japan, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 56th mtg. at ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.67
(2001).
179. See CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 79 (noting that the ILO
is the only agency that attended every one of the Committee’s first nine sessions); id. at 224
(arguing that the Committee’s appropriate role regarding labor rights protection is to provide
supplementary monitoring to countries that have not ratified specific ILO conventions); id.
at 260 (arguing that the negotiators of the ICESCR contemplated a major role for the ILO in
monitoring the Covenant); id. at 285 (noting that ILO representatives have provided
important assistance and information to the Committee); but see id. at 357 (decrying the
“minimal level” of the ILO’s cooperation with the Committee).
180. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Japan, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 56th mtg. at ¶¶ 18, 45, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.67 (2001) (citing various ILO conventions); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess.,
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relations and multinational corporations rarely arise in the Committee’s
statements. The Committee recommended to Mexico that it take “energetic
steps to mitigate any negative impact” of the NAFTA on ESCRs.181 In its
observations to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Committee predicted
that a WTO Dispute Settlement Body decision might “have adverse
consequences” for the government’s ability to adhere to the Covenant.182
The Committee also noted the negative effects of the trade embargo
imposed on Armenia by neighboring countries.183 In its Honduran Closing
Arguments, the Committee “strongly recommends that the State party
implement existing legislative and administrative measures to avoid
violations of environmental and labor laws by transnational companies,”184
and that the Syrian government take its Covenant obligations into account
when negotiating with the World Trade Organization.185
The Committee should continue, and significantly enhance, these efforts
to expand the scope of its scrutiny. Private companies engaging in
significantly deleterious business practices can be named and their
activities should be raised with governments most responsible for their
existence. The Committee has been pragmatic and activist in its procedural
arrangements; it must continue to be as creative as possible to identify the
most significant potential sources for protecting economic, social and
cultural rights, and working with its own constituency of States’ Parties to
access them.

46th mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/17 (1994) (referring to the ILO Committee of
Experts and ILO Convention No. 111).
181. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41
(1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 49th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/16
(1994). In its 1999 Concluding Observations on Mexico, the Committee commended
Mexico for the measures it had taken. Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 (1999).
182. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 45th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.21 (1997).
183. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Armenia, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.39
(1999).
184. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Honduras, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.57
(2001).
185. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 29, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001).
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Military Action

The harmful effect of military actions on economic, social and cultural
rights arises occasionally in Committee statements. The Committee has
recognized security concerns,186 ongoing wars,187 internal military
clashes,188 concluded transnational and civil wars,189 and regional conflicts
not involving the State Party.190 The Committee argues that violence in
Colombia is “in part brought about” by maldistribution of wealth.191
North-on-south actions have arisen in a few cases. The Committee noted

186. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27
(1998).
187. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Azerbaijan, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.20
(1997).
188. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Kyrgyzstan, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49
(2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights:Republic of the Congo, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Georgia, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 21st mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.42 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Sri Lanka, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.24 (1998); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Peru, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.14 (1997); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Colombia, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 179, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1995/12 (1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Algeria, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶¶ 3, 14, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1995/17 (1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Philippines, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 29th mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N.
Doc.E/C.12/1995/7, (1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Kenya, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/6 (1993).
189. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Republic of the Congo, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Iraq, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 52d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.17 (1997); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Peru, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.14 (1997); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: El Salvador, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.4 (1996); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Nicaragua, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/14 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Vietnam, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/8 (1993).
190. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Bulgaria, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 50th-50st mtgs. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.37 (1999).
191. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Colombia, U.N. ESCOR, 13th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 179, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/12
(1996).
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the loss of housing stock when the United States invaded Panama,192 and
has documented the effects of international embargos.193 However, it
appears to have made no recommendations to a State Party regarding its
participation in the decision to continue or impose an embargo.
B. Differential Treatment of Southern States
A second relevant aspect of post-colonial theory is its general
attentiveness to “a history still in process,” or the currently discriminatory
aspects of international action, and the differential impact on southern
states vis-à-vis the former colonizer states.194 Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith
call human rights “the ‘new’ standard replacing civilization as the criterion
for dividing and judging the world”195 as an “instrument of occidental
assertion.”196 Elements of the ICESCR regime particularly responsive to
this concern include the Committee’s equalization paradigms and use of
enforcement language, the Committee’s attention to its anti-discrimination
mandate, and the audience for its recommendations. These aspects of the
Committee’s work lend themselves favorably to a post-colonial theory
review. Another related aspect of the Committee’s work tends instead to
confirm a classic north-south critique of the human rights regime: the
Committee’s treatment of culturally based practices.
1.

Equalization Paradigms and Enforcement Language

Apart from the north-south implications of the Committee’s attention to
factors such as structural adjustment and violent conflicts,
acknowledgement of these realities carries particular legal significance.
This is because of the significant “margin of discretion” codified in
192. Concluding Observations: Report on the Technical Assistance Mission to Panama
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., at ¶
21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/18 (1995) (noting that the United States invasion resulted in the
destruction of “hundreds of dwellings”); id. at ¶ 62 (discussing financing by USAID and the
government for repair of damage due to the “military action”). The Committee also
documented an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights complaint by Panamanian
civil society regarding the allocation of individual awards for invasion losses. Id. at ¶¶ 6365.
193. E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Iraq, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 52d mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.17 (1997)
(oil embargo); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 13, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.15 (1997) (Security Council aerial embargo).
194. See Gandhi, supra note 108, at 18 (quoting David Lloyd, 1993, p. 11); id. at 17-18;
see also SAN JUAN, supra note 107, at 9 (describing post-colonial theory as concerned with
“manifestations of ‘unevenness’”); see also YOUNG, supra note 4, at 11.
195. See Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 2, at 5 (citing G.W. GONG, THE
STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION” IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 18 (1984)).
196. Id.
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Covenant article 2(1), in which each State Party “undertakes to take steps
. . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized” in the
Covenant.197 Although the Committee has interpreted the obligation as
tightly as possible,198 nonetheless a determination of a State Party’s
available resources, or lack thereof, becomes relevant to its inquiry into
individual states’ implementation of the Covenant.199
The Committee continues to acknowledge difficulty factors in a
“Concluding Observations” section entitled “Factors and Difficulties
Impeding the Implementation of the Covenant.” The Committee rarely
passes explicit judgment on a claimed factor as a valid excuse for failure to
implement the Covenant. However, its acknowledgement of particular
difficulties ranges in strength from asserting that a problem “ha[s] seriously
affected the capacity of the State party to implement the Covenant,”200 to
“recognizing” that a particular problem is an impediment to the
government’s “capacity to enhance the enjoyment of ESCRs,”201 to merely
“not[ing] the State party’s statement” about the impact of a negative
factor.202 The Committee labeled as “technical” Canada’s problem
gathering statistics from its constituent federal units,203 and explicitly
dismissed proffered difficulties in a few cases, including Iceland’s assertion
that it could not implement the right to strike because of its economy’s
dependence on one industry.204 The Committee has also made specific
findings that several industrialized States’ Party suffer no impediments to

197. ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 2(1).
198. See, e.g., The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, ¶ 1): CESCR General
Comment 3, at ¶ 2 (1990) (noting that the obligation “to take steps” is not itself limited); id.
at ¶ 5 (finding several Covenant articles to be “capable of immediate application”); id. at ¶ 9
(interpreting “progressive realization” to prohibit retrogressive measures) [hereinafter
General Comment 3].
199. See CRAVEN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT, supra note 29, at 138-39.
200. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Jamaica, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 85th mtg. at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.75
(2001) (stating the existance of financial crisis and high debt burden have made it difficult
to implement the ICESCR).
201. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001) (emphasis added) (explaining the country’s high debt burden as a
reason for not fulfilling its obligations under the ICESCR).
202. Id. at ¶ 10 (explaining that the partial foreign occupation of its territory resulting in
a need for higher military spending).
203. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Canada, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 18th mtg. at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/5
(1993).
204. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Iceland, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/15
(1994).
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implementation at all.205
Though the Committee has been passing judgment on member
governments’ implementation of the Covenant for fifteen years, it has
classified relatively few situations as actual violations of the Covenant. The
only routinely declared violation is the failure to comply with the Covenant
reporting obligations.206 Other examples of state acts found to be violations
include: discrimination,207 travel restrictions,208 high teen suicide and
domestic violence rates,209 failure to provide maternity benefits,210 forced
205. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: France, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 77th mtg. at ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.72
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Iceland, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 20th mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.32
(1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Ireland, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 25th-26th mtgs. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.35 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. ESCOR,
11th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/19 (1994). See also Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Austria, U.N.
ESCOR, 11th Sess., 52d mtg. at passim, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/16 (1994) (lacking “factors
and difficulties” section); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at passim, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/17 (1994) (lacking “factors and difficulties” section).
206. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Togo, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶¶ 3, 17, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.61 (2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Rebublic of the Congo, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶¶ 3, 24,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.45 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Solomon Islands, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess., 24th
mtg. at ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.33 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, U.N. ESCOR,
17th Sess., 45th mtg. at ¶¶ 3, 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.21 (1997); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Guinea, U.N.
ESCOR, 14th Sess., 22d mtg. at ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.5 (1996); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mali, U.N.
ESCOR, 11th Sess., 44th mtg. at ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/17 (1994); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mauritius, U.N.
ESCOR, 10th Sess., 43d mtg. at ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/8 (1994); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Kenya, U.N.
ESCOR, 8th Sess., 19th mtg. at ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/6 (1993).
207. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Iran, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 20th mtg. at ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/7 (1993).
208. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 47th mtg. at ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.69
(2001); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27
(1998).
209. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Sri Lanka, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 25th mtg. at ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.24
(1998).
210. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Switzerland, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 55th mtg. at ¶ 15, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.30 (1998).
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evictions,211 failure to accord economic, social and cultural rights
constitutional status,212 minimum wage five times below the “officially set
basic food basket,”213 and promulgation of a law asserting close control
over NGOs.214 Interestingly enough, a comfort level with using stronger
language about failures to report may have a different north-south impact,
as states with overdue reports are statistically more likely to be developing
countries.215 At the same time, given the fact that few negative implications
attach to neglect of reporting duties, the possibility of escaping notice
through non-reporting could be a strong motive for some states.216 Apart
from this aspect, the violations findings focused on both southern and
northern countries, and no State Party, even one receiving high praise from
the Committee, escapes receiving numerous recommendations about
progressive steps to be taken,217 suggesting that the primary goal of the
reporting process is facilitative rather than judgmental.
2.

Fundamental Nature of the Recommendations

As the Article 2(1) analysis suggests, protection of economic, social and
cultural rights is to some extent dependent on available resources. Given
this reality, the Committee’s primary task is to identify available areas of
discretion, and urge the most rights-protective policy choices on StatesParty and the inter-governmental agencies amenable to the Committee’s
blandishments. With the number of international agencies focused on
poverty alleviation, it may seem somewhat surprising at what a
fundamental level many of the Committee’s recommendations arise. For
example, the Committee frequently advocates that States Parties collect and
211. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Dominican Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 11th Sess., 55th mtg. at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1994/15 (1994); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Nicaragua, U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 46th mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1993/14 (1994).
212. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 53d mtg. at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27
(1998).
213. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41
(1999).
214. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Egypt, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., 26th mtg. at ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.44
(2000).
215. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 37, at 9 (pointing to a reduced level of human rights
protection as another reason for poor reporting).
216. See id. (noting that the late submission of a state report is generally ignored).
217. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶¶ 15-42, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.70 (2001).
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disseminate data on basic poverty issues, including data on homelessness
and hunger.218 In the Concluding Observations for industrialized countries,
recommendations tend to center on the need for data on more specialized
issues, such as AIDS and domestic violence.219 The Committee urged
Finland to establish a legal minimum wage,220 and Uruguay to make its
minimum wage more than “only . . . an indicator.”221 The Concluding
Observations for Australia, Canada, Egypt, and Germany reveal that those
countries have not established an official poverty line.222 From a northsouth-sensitive perspective, it seems clear that these types of fundamental
recommendations are frequently issued to industrialized countries.
3.

Vulnerable Populations

To the extent that post-colonial theory particularly works to highlight
concerns about race,223 the Committee’s interpretation of its Article 2(2)
anti- discrimination mandate is worth mentioning. Article 2(2) guarantees

218. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 40, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.70 (2001) (privatization of health care); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Suriname, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess.,
27th mtg. at ¶¶ 9, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/6 (1995) (vulnerable populations, working and
abandoned children, and the informal sector); Concluding Observations of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Iraq, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 26th-27th mtgs. at
¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/6 (1994) (educational opportunities); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: New Zealand,
U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 40th mtg. at ¶¶ 15, 21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/13 (1994)
(malnutrition, hunger and homelessness).
219. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Finland, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., 75th mtg. at ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.52
(2000) (domestic violence); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 54th mtg. at ¶ 23, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.29 (1998) (AIDS); Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 12th Sess., 27th mtg. at ¶ 10,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1995/5 (1995) (domestic violence).
220. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Finland, U.N. ESCOR, 15th Sess., 51st mtg. at ¶¶ 13, 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.8
(1996).
221. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Uruguay, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., 54th mtg. ¶¶ 9, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.18
(1997).
222. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Australia, U.N. ESCOR, 23d Sess., 55th mtg. ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.50
(2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Canada, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 58th mtg. ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.31
(1998); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Germany, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 54th mtg. ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.29
(1998).
223. See, e.g., PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992); Ruth
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 903, 967 (1997).
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equal enjoyment of ESCRs regardless of “race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.”224 The Committee has interpreted 2(2) as one of the
Covenant articles that is fully justiciable and capable of immediate
application.225
Many of the General Comments include a non-discrimination analysis on
the protection of indigenous and other minority groups,226 as do most of the
Concluding Observations.
For example, the recent Concluding
Observation on Sweden included comments and recommendations
concerning “discrimination against immigrants and refugees in the
workplace, ratification of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,
and provision of education in minority and immigrant languages”.227
Similarly, the Committee consistently raises concerns regarding gender.228
4.

Treatment of Cultural and Religious Practices
Postcolonial theory flags the difficult issue of cultural relativism.

224. ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 2(2).
225. Twenty-first session (1999): General Comment No. 13 The right to education (art.
13), in English Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 74, 81-82 ¶¶ 31-37 HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001).
226. See Sixth Session (1991): Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
General Comment No. 4, The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant) in
English Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 22, 25 ¶ 9, 27 ¶ 17, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); Thirteenth
session (1995): General Comment No. 6 The economic, social and cultural rights of older
persons, in English Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 38, 39 ¶ 5, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001);
Sixteenth session (1997): General Comment No. 7 The right to adequate housing (art. 11(1)
of the Covenant): forced evictions, in English Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 49, 51 ¶ 10,
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); Nineteenth session (1998): General Comment No. 9 The domestic
application of the Covenant, in English Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 58, 60 ¶ 9,
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); Twenty-first session (1999): General Comment No. 13 The right
to education (art. 13), in English Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 74, 75 ¶ 4
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001); see also id. at 81-82 ¶¶ 31-37; Twenty-second session (2000):
General Comment No. 14 The right to the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12), in
English Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 90, 90 ¶ 2, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001).
227. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 75th mtg. ¶¶ 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70
(2001) (“discrimination on ethnic grounds in the workplace”); id. ¶ 28 (Sami land rights);
id. ¶ 29 (discrimination against immigrants and refugees); id. ¶ 17 (ratification of the
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention); id. ¶ 30 (gender participation in the labor
market); id. ¶ 38 (instruction in minority/immigrant languages); id. ¶¶ 23, 39 (exploitation
of minors and women abroad).
228. See id. ¶ 30 (expressing concern with the issue of gender participation in the labor
market); see also id. ¶ 39 (remarking on the exploitation of women abroad).
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Rolando Gaete poses cultural relativism as one of “two opposite dangers
. . . to be avoided: the absolutism of certain appeals to culture and the
absolutism of a humanist secular fundamentalism.”229 Leela Ghandi
describes the dilemma this way: “Caught between the harsh extremes of
ethnic cleansing, on the one hand, and the militaristic American
purification of the un-American world on the other, post-colonialism
ponders a ceasefire.”230
The Committee has not, of course, escaped grappling with questions
about cultural and religious practices that clash with human rights norms.
To date, it has taken a universalist stance on many customary practices,
commending prosecution of practitioners of female genital mutilation,231
and condemning customary practices such as low legal age of marriage for
girls,232 forced marriage of widows to brothers-in-law,233 sexual servitude
to religious leaders,234 polygamy,235 restrictions on abortion,236 gendered
Aboriginal marital property rights,237 and “deeply rooted traditions and
cultural prejudices [that] marginalize certain categories of persons, such as
migrant workers and some women.”238 In one interesting instance, the
Republic of Korea government asserted a cultural norm of high esteem for

229. Rolando Gaete, Rites of Passage into the Global Village, in LAWS OF THE
POSTCOLONIAL 233, 235 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999).
230. Ghandi, supra note 108, at 129.
231. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: France, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 77th mtg. ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.72 (2001);
see also Review of the Implementation of CESCR: Togo, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th
mtg. ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.61 (2001) (commending Togo’s promotional attempts to
lower instances of FGM).
232. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. ¶¶ 12, 14, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001).
233. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Zimbabwe, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., 25th mtg. ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.12
(1997).
234. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Nepal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 55th mtg. ¶¶ 10, 18, 43, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.66 (2001).
235. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Senegal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 53d mtg. ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62
(2001).
236. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Poland, U.N. ESCOR, 18th Sess., 26th mtg. ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.26
(1998).
237. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Canada, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 57th mtg. ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.31
(1998).
238. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Republic of Korea, U.N. ESCOR, 25th Sess., 26th mtg. ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.59 (2001).
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teachers as its reason for limiting teachers’ union activities.239 The
Committee rejected this rationale.240 The Committee also noted that
“prevailing Chinese traditions” favoring “avoiding direct confrontations
and strikes in favour of personal or family ties” hamper collective
bargaining and strikes in Macau.241

C. The Poorest Child in the Poorest Country
A third concern found in the postcolonial theoretical literature is a
concern with the need to elevate the voices of the most oppressed people.242
Seeking theoretical integrity, post-colonial academics present important
challenges to the human rights regime, but appear to be sympathetic to
many of the values at least facially expressed in human rights standards.
Predictably, this is not an uncomplicated relationship. One of foundational
concepts of postcolonial theory is the notion of subalternity. The theorists
use subalternity to mean both “the in-between class,” or the indigenous
“lieutenants of the ruling class as opposed to the masses.”243 However,
Young points out that the focus of the influential Subaltern Studies journal
is “very much at the bottom of the social scale.”244 At the conference for
which this paper was produced, one of the noted post-colonial theorists
present stated that he, and, he felt sure, many of his colleagues, had “said
things” at human rights conferences for which they felt ashamed.
In translating these admittedly reluctant activist orientations into the
specific work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
there is clearly a large and meaningful area of overlap. Within the bounds
of international coercion that postcolonial theory might “tolerate,” it seems
that the key question is one of effectiveness. Like most human rights
entities, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has a
broad mandate and severely insufficient resources for carrying it out. The
Committee is charged with management of 142 treaty signatories,
standards development and promotion and outreach to technical agencies,
239. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Nepal, U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 55th mtg. ¶ 10, 18, 43, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66
(2001).
240. Id.
241. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Portugal (Macau), U.N. ESCOR, 15th Sess., 54th mtg. ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.9 (1996).
242. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 4, at 354. But see San Juan, supra note 107, at 13
(stating that “outside of the multiculturalism debate,” postcolonial theory has failed to focus
attention on important concerns that “elude representation in the postal conversation,” such
as refugees, political prisoners, refugees, unjust wars, and vulnerable workers).
243. YOUNG, supra note 4, at 354.
244. Id.
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but currently has the assistance of only two UN secretariat staff members.
The Committee rarely travels, and never on its own budget, so it has to rely
on the fact finding of other agencies, which are rarely specialized enough to
meet the Committee’s needs, and the work of governments and civil
society participating in the reporting process. Despite strategic work on the
part of the Committee and the many attempts of the Committee’s
constituent international NGOs to support domestic civil society,245 this
limitation inevitably cuts off much participation by southern NGOs and
relevant domestic government actors.246 The resulting northern bias in the
discussions clearly does no one any good.
V. CONCLUSION
In making these suggestions for the priorities and development of the
Committee, the author cannot help but feel the legacy of a little-known
Hungarian political writer named Zoltán Szilágyi. Dr. Szilágyi’s 1986
treatise, The United Nations’ Role in the Liquidation of Colonialism,
fulsomely celebrated the work of the UN Special Committee on the
Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation. Published by the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for World Economy, Dr.
Szilágyi’s treatise pledged the support of socialist nations in “the fight for
economic de-colonization.”247
The existence of one more obscure committee, and moreover one that
may soon be subsumed in a larger body with a massive mandate, can
hardly seem to matter, for example, to a malnourished child living in a poor
country, on the brink of a painful, utterly preventable death of dysentery.
Moreover, the days appear to be gone when a UN Committee will request
that the Secretary General “undertake . . . a sustained and broad campaign
. . . informing world public opinion of the facts concerning the pillaging of
natural resources in colonial territories and the exploitation of their
indigenous populations by foreign monopolies.”248 With neither the
splendid rhetoric of the 1970s nor the heat of the anti-apartheid movement,
the legacy of the Committee’s first fifteen years may have to stand or fall
on the references to the General Comment 3 in Grootboom, the
groundbreaking South African constitutional case granting limited housing
245. See Dandan, supra note 57, at 228-29.
246. See, e.g., Stefanie Grant, The NGO Role: Implementation, Expanding Protection
and Monitoring the Monitors, in THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 212 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000) (noting that in the absence of treaty body capacity
to liaison directly with national NGO’s access by national NGO’s will be uneven).
247. ZOLTÁN SZILÁGYI, THE UNITED NATIONS’ ROLE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF
COLONIALISM 81 (1986).
248. Annual Report of the Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration
on Decolonisation (k).
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rights to displaced people.249
However, to the extent that post-colonial theory is generically concerned
with revealing the otherwise hidden messages of the “subaltern,” and “the
suffering,” its goals would seem to converge with those of the Committee
and the activists influencing its development. Identifying and alleviating
suffering in the global south must involve leveraging important sources of
power and resources. The international financial community, both private
and inter-governmental, commands significant control and resources in the
global south, all sides must agree that influencing it in a re-distributive
direction is critical to the goal of alleviating suffering. The Committee
should work to become expert in operations of the international financial
institutions and multi-national corporations, and partner with its states
parties to manage their interactions with these powerful actors in a way that
lessens human suffering.
Differences clearly exist. Post-colonialists might urge the Committee
away from taking coercive measures against former colonies, because of
the impossibility of erasing the historical taint and the attendant likelihood
of inappropriate and counterproductive intervention. A human rights
activist might urge the Committee to use any tool at its disposal to
maximize its influence over the potentially re-distributive policies of
former colonies. A post-colonial agenda for the Committee would
doubtless include a greater attention to regional diversity in the
Committee’s membership and staff, an issue that has not been strongly
pressed by the civil society currently interacting with the Committee.
The decisions the Committee makes about its priorities and methods are
critically important. The Committee provides at least some counterpoint to
the relentless privatization and trickle down economics peddled elsewhere
in the international community. It has proven that it can make an impact in
the formation of progressive new soft law on remedial welfare issues. The
Committee is leveraging marginal international resources uniquely to
advocate and support policies that will benefit the poorest child in the
poorest country. Upendra Baxi summarizes the argument best: “[T]he
nirvana that contemporary human rights seek is sometimes said to suffer
from a relatively impoverished cosmology. However, human rights
activism has its own dharma, which is the performance of righteous deeds
(karma) which, too, earn merit (punnya) to redeem the “soul.”250 The
249. See Government of RSA and others v. Grootboom and others, Constitutional Court,
1995(1)SA46(CC). In that case, the South African Supreme Court used the Committee’s
progressive reading of Covenant Article 2(2) to interpret the South African Constitutional
provision on right of access to housing. Id. at 45. For an assessment of the domestic
implications of Grootboom, see Pierre De Vos, Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing
and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness, 17 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 258 (2001).
250. Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT’L
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International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
made important strides in its first fifteen years, and must continue to use
creative efforts to carry out its critical mission of speaking for the poor.

L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 154 (1998).

